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Major devices to determine the order of equity principles are the following:
Rose et al. (1998) distinguish between “allocation-based”, “outcome-based”,
and “process-based” principles. The first group focuses on the initial
allocation of property rights of GHG emissions, such as the egalitarian, sovereignty,
polluter pays, and ability-to-pay principles. The second group of principles
examines the outcome in terms of welfare changes41
caused by emissions reduction efforts, such as the horizontal, vertical, compensation,
and utilitarian principles. The third category recognizes the libertarian, political
consensus, and Rawls’ maximin as guiding principles to the process of emission
allocation. Shue (1993) divides principles of justice into “fault-based”
and “no-fault” principles. The ability-to-pay, for example, is no-fault
in the sense that guilt is irrelevant to the assignment of responsibility to
pay. The richest should pay the highest rates no matter how they acquired what
they own. In contrast, the polluter-pays principle, an economic principle that
polluters should bear the cost of abatement without subsidy (Rayner et al.,
1999), is based upon fault or, alternatively, upon an amoral rationale of causal
responsibility, or simply that the assignment of burden creates an incentive
to not pollute. Thus, fault need not be a moral issue. Rowlands (1997) differentiates,
among other things, according to aspects of historical difference (if any).
The classification is based on whether past usage has established present and
future rights, be it the same (grandfathering) or be it a correction for injustices
from the past (natural debt). Agarwal and Narain (2000) outline the concept
of contraction and convergence. This is the entitlement of GHG emissions budgets
in terms of future emissions rights. Such a global future emissions budget is
based on a global upper limit of atmospheric concentration of CO2,
for instance 450ppmv (contraction). This budget is then distributed as entitlements
to emit CO2 in the future, and all countries will agree to converge
on a per-capita emission entitlement (convergence). Level of contraction and
timing of convergence are subject to negotiations with respect to the precautionary
principle.
The Kyoto Protocol endorses the principle of differentiation among countries
(between Annex B and non-Annex B) and within Annex B countries for emissions
reduction targets. However, details of the form of JI and the endowment of GHG
emissions rights remain to be established. Also, future negotiations to determine
national targets after 2012, as well as the question of commitments for developing
countries, need to be discussed. Accordingly, several proposals for the differentiation
of national GHG reduction targets, as well as multiform modelling exercises
to explore the consequences of the different proposals, have been published
recently. An overview is given in Table 10.10.
| Table 10.10: Selected studies of applied equity
principles and burden-sharing rules |
 |
| Reference |
Subject of investigation |
Geographical mapping |
Results |
|
| |
|
|
Numerical results* |
|
| Torvanger and Godal (1999) |
Emission limitations that could occur if burdens were to follow the
- Sovereignty pinciple
- Egalitarian principle (to fulfil the Kyoto Protocol)
- Ability-to-pay principle (assuming no increase in emissions)
|
Countries in Baltic Sea Region |
Sov. |
Egal. |
Abil. |
|
| |
all |
|
|
|
| Denmark |
–6 |
18 |
–14 |
|
| Estonia |
–6 |
–37 |
–4 |
|
| Finland |
–6 |
27 |
–15 |
|
| Germany |
–6 |
8 |
–12 |
|
| Iceland |
–6 |
45 |
–13 |
|
| Latvia |
–6 |
23 |
–4 |
|
| Lithuania |
–6 |
19 |
–3 |
|
| Norway |
–6 |
29 |
–13 |
|
| Poland |
–6 |
15 |
–1 |
|
| Russia |
–6 |
112 |
–14 |
|
| Sweden |
–6 |
–20 |
–4 |
|
| |
|
|
* changes compared to 1990 levels, in per cent |
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Rose et al. (1998) |
|
Global, 9 Regions |
Sov. |
Egal. |
Hor. |
Vert. |
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
- Sovereignty
- Egalitarian
- Horizontal
- Vertical
|
USA |
8.2 |
67.7 |
9.5 |
17.3 |
| |
Can, W. Europe |
5.6 |
29.8 |
7.0 |
3.3 |
| |
Other OECD |
1.5 |
12.5 |
3.8 |
8.2 |
| |
EEFSU |
6.2 |
55.9 |
4.1 |
1.1 |
| |
China |
3.9 |
-25.4 |
1.2 |
0.0 |
| |
Middle East |
1.0 |
0.3 |
1.3 |
0.6 |
| |
Africa |
0.8 |
-36.3 |
0.8 |
0.0 |
| |
Latin America |
1.3 |
-10.6 |
1.3 |
0.1 |
| |
Southeast Asia |
2.1 |
-63.3 |
1.6 |
0.0 |
| |
EEFSU: Eastern Europe and Former Soviet Union |
|
* net cost impacts in the year 2005, in billions
of 1990 US$ |
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| OECD/IEA (1994) |
Emission limitations following 10% reduction in world emissions according
to
- Egalitarian
- Horizontal
- Vertical
|
Global, 10 Regions |
|
Egal. |
Hor. |
Vert. |
| |
|
|
|
|
|
| |
North America |
|
11 |
2.5 |
12 |
| |
West/North Europe |
|
7 |
2 |
12 |
| |
Pacific OECD |
|
21 |
3 |
52 |
| |
Central/E. Europe |
|
25 |
39 |
6 |
| |
Former SU |
|
11 |
8 |
4 |
| |
East Asia |
|
8 |
14 |
6 |
| |
China |
|
3 |
23 |
2 |
| |
Middle East |
|
23 |
24 |
13 |
| |
Latin America |
|
7 |
12 |
5 |
| |
Africa |
|
5 |
24 |
3 |
| |
|
|
* in per cent |
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Reference |
Subject of investigation |
Geographical mapping |
Main features |
|
|
Elzen et al. (1999, 2000)
FAIR model (Framework to Assess International Regimes for burden sharing)
|
- the Brazilian proposal (revised and original approach), as application
of polluter-pays principle
- Brazilian methodology for estimating historical emissions
|
Analysis extended to global scale |
- only allocation-based criteria
- accounting for historical emissions and/or a per-capita approach favour
developing countries
- inclusion of all GHG and land use emissions favours developed countries
|
| |
- Triptych approach
Phylipsen et al. (1998)
Blok et al. (1997)
Sector oriented
|
|
- energy-related CO2 emissions may still increase because
of high growth in non-Annex I emissions, especially in industrial sector
- energy efficiency plays a major role in emissions reduction if combined
with global diffusion of technology
|
| |
|
|
|
| Byrne et al. (1998) |
Proposal for egalitarian principle on the basis of 1989 population |
140 countries
Four income groups |
- achieving economic parity in 2050
- increase in CO2 emissions for low-income
countries
- reduction in CO2 emission for upper-income
countries
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Ringuis et al. (1998) |
Horizontal:
equal weight,
CO2/capita, CO2/unit GDP, GDP/capita, GDP, CO2
|
OECD |
- none of the rules in which it is possible to allocate costs among
countries and into economic and social drivers equalizes costs across
the OECD
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Rowlands (1997) |
Historical (reactive and proactive)
Equality
Efficiency |
OECD |
- twin-track strategy: short term flat-rate approach, long-term differentiated
approach
|
|
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